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The 47 Percent: U.S. Trends in Income
Maintenance and Medicaid Spending, 1990-2011
Elgin Mannion
Gordon C. Chang
We analyze trends and variations in state-level expenditure
growth for Medicaid, SSI, SNAP, and TANF. We explore three
areas of interest: (1) How program structure impacts growth;
(2) How programs responded to the 2008/2009 recession; and (3)
How state preference for limited government, measured by RightTo-Work (RTW) status and political affiliation, impacts program
expenditure growth. Findings show that program structure impacts expenditure growth: the state-matched programs like TANF
and Medicaid grew slower from 1990-2011 than did open-ended
federal programs like SNAP. OLS models found states with RTW
policies and large Hispanic populations positively associated with
higher income maintenance and Medicaid expenditure growth.
Key words: income maintenance, Medicaid, program expenditure
growth, limited government, political affiliation, right-to-work
status, Hispanic populations

All Western industrial governments re-distribute the national product through a variety of programs, for a variety of
purposes (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). While the United States is
relatively more restrained than comparable nations in developing its welfare institutions, programs directed to serving the
bottom quartile of the population have been the target of persistent criticism. Means-tested programs without an income
stream have generally been the object of the most vocal calls
for cutbacks and reforms. Opponents point to the continously
increasing enrollment numbers and expenditures, possibly resulting in a national pattern of dependency (Eberstadt, 2012).
The 2012 Presidential election campaign exposed the deep
political cleavages concerning government transfer payments
targeted to the poor. Mitt Romney markedly said, at a private
fundraiser on May 17, 2012, that 47% of Americans paid zero
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federal income tax and were thus “dependent upon government” and “will vote for the president no matter what” (see
Mother Jones News Team, 2012).
Post election, attacks on transfer programs are represented in the recent legislation, The Nutrition Reform and Work
Opportunity Act of 2013 (H.R. 3102, 2013). In an unprecedented
move, the Bill decoupled the Food Stamp or SNAP programs
from the Farm Bill, potentially increasing its political vulnerability (H.R. 3102, 2013; House Committee on Agriculture,
2013). The bill proposes to downsize the SNAP program over
the 2014-2023 periods, reducing funding by $40 billion and enrollment by 14 million. In addition, the bill contains sweeping changes to how the program operates. The Southerland
Amendment to the bill proposes to reinstate the asset and
income tests and work requirements, to eliminate state performance bonuses, actually providing incentives to states to cut
program participation (Rogers, 2013). The bill further proposes lifetime bans for felons, drug testing of recipients by states,
sanctioning of USDA and state staff for promoting the program,
and, most importantly, shifting the burden of funding to state
governments. Vocal advocates of block grants cite the advantages of greater state control and autonomy, and the potential
for national and regional budget savings (Stenberg, 2008; see
also Dilger & Boyd, 2013). Opponents to the proposed reform
of SNAP (and Medicaid) into block grants argue that they may
lead to deep cuts to the most needy populations, less oversight
(Waller, 2005), and may increase the political vulnerability of
the program (Pavetti & Schott, 2011).
In order to help inform the increasingly polarized debate
about the future of means-tested programs, we analyze the
general trends and variations in state-level expenditure
growth for Medicaid, SSI, SNAP, and TANF, the programs targeted to poverty groups that do not have an income stream.
We explore the following issues that may affect expenditure
growth: (1) Program structure: Current legislation proposes to
turn SNAP into flat-funded state block grants, and block grant
reform for Medicaid is in debate. Does program structure
(joint state/federal or federally funded) affect state spending
levels? (2) Program flexibility and utility: Income maintenance
programs are intended to provide a safety need for needy
populations. How well did the four programs respond to the
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2008/2009 recession? (3) Political preference and economic policy:
Does the preference for small government inform state-level
redistributive policies, and result in slower growth and lower
expenditures for means-tested programs at the state level? Do
business-friendly, state-level economic policies, namely Rightto-Work (RTW) legislation, influence the state-level program
expenditure?

Income Maintenance: Important Safety Net,
or Political “Gifts” and Efficiency Drain?
President Kennedy (1962) once remarked about fiscal
policy: “the myths are legion and the truths hard to find.” The
ideological divide over income maintenance programs cuts
to the core of what type of society and size of government
is considered desirable, and what fiscal strategy best fosters
economic growth, with little or no common ground. From the
progressive perspective, the income distribution is a “public
good” (Thurow, 1971). Income maintenance programs provide
an important safety net for the needy and result in a more
equitable distribution (Cassiman, 2008; see also Calvo, 2011).
While some short-term effects may be observed, they do not
necessarily encourage long-term dependency (e.g., Vartanian,
Houser, & Harkness, 2011). Governments redistribute resources to the poor for the political purposes of stability and
equity (Okun, 1975; Thurow, 1971) or the objectives of stimulating aggregate demand in economic downturns (Romer &
Bernstein, 2009; Weber, 2000; Zandi, 2008). From the Keynesian
perspective (Keynes, 1964), transfer payments along with government purchases and tax cuts are important fiscal tools for
government to deploy in times of economic contraction, creating a “floor” beneath which aggregate demand cannot fall.
Tax cuts and transfer payments are best targeted to the middle
and lower end of the distribution rather than the top, as they
are more likely to immediately consume. Roosevelt’s New
Deal and the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s “War on
Poverty” programs subscribed to this theory of active government intervention in the economy, creating the very poverty
programs now so hotly contested.
By contrast, the “classical” economic tradition prefers a
minimalist model of state intervention. Resources need to
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be shifted to those in the position to efficiently use them, the
“savings class,” or in new parlance, the “job creators” (Bradley
& Rector, 2010; Mankiw, 2013). Fiscal policy focused on deficit
spending measurably impairs economic growth (Reinhart &
Rogoff, 2010) by reducing labor market flexibility and diverting
scarce sources from productive use (Gylfason, 1999). Personal
government transfers “leak” economic efficiency and stifle innovation (Mankiw, 2013; Okun, 1975) in the misguided quest
for equity. From the Public Choice Perspective (Buchanon &
Tullock, 1962), income maintenance programs are examples of
the “disease of democracy” (Rowley, 1993). They constitute,
in Romney’s words, the political “gifts” (quoted in Berman,
2012) to voters that actively create the notorious 47%, or the
“rent seeking” government-transfer-dependent populations
(Becker, 1985). A Nation of Takers by Nicholas Eberstadt (2012)
is a recent, widely publicized restatement of this argument,
finding exponential growth in transfer payment from 1960 to
2010.
Such a preference for limited government, a quest for
Federalist state autonomy, informs the debate on devolving
programs such as SNAP and Medicaid into flat-funded block
grants. The literature on the desirability of means-tested block
grants as a model for income maintenance is divided. Block
grants are fixed amounts (Dilger & Boyd, 2013), and are thus
viewed as an aid in trimming costs on the local and federal
level, as noted by Senator Paul Ryan. Block grants give the
states, which are purportedly best qualified for local problemsolving, the needed flexibility to do so without the federal
strings attached. They differ in legal status from open-ended
entitlements structured like SNAP and Medicaid, which create
individual “rights” to benefits that can be litigated (King, 2000;
Melnick, 1994). Opponents point to incidences where states'
broad flexibility can divert funding from the needy (Posner &
Wrightson, 1996) and lack the effective, mandatory program
oversight built into entitlement programs (Waller, 2005).
Recent policy innovations by conservative governors at
the state-level target entitlement reforms (Malanga, 2013). The
combination of state budget shortfalls and vocal political aversion to redistributive programs creates a renewed need for
comprehensive, comparative analysis of state-level funding
and policy outcomes. The existing literature identifies major
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factors explaining state-level variations in social spending.
Economic factors identified include per capita incomes and a
state’s fiscal and revenue capacity (Holcombe & Stroup, 1996).
Interestingly, states with less fiscal capacity spend less on social
programs, despite federal grants, and use less of their own resources (Dilger, 1998; The Lewin Group, 2004). Most studies
do not find a link between political culture, executive party
control at the state-level, and state spending levels (Dilger,
1998; Holcombe & Stroup, 1996), with a few exceptions (Elazar,
1966; Hager & Talbert, 2000).
We explore an added political and economic proxy measure
of interest to capture state-level preference of limited government and pro-business policies, the individual states’ Right-to
Work status. Currently, 23 states have RTW laws, with Indiana
becoming the most recent RTW state in February 2012. RTW
legislations generally outlaw “union security” clauses, mandating workers in a collectively bargained contract to pay a
share of the cost for union representation. RTW laws by themselves alone may have little effect on shaping economic performance, but they are a proxy of a vast array of “business friendly” measures that states have adopted to increase labor market
flexibility, such as low tax rates, cash incentives for relocation,
and lax environmental and safety regulations (Holmes, 2000;
Lafer & Allegretto, 2011). Central to RTW policies is control of
labor costs, and RTW states generally have lower per capita
personal incomes (Gallagher, 2012).

Historical Background of U.S.
Means-Tested Transfer Programs
In American public political discourse, the neutral term
“transfers” has long been abandoned in the fight to curb government spending (Lind, 2012). Rather than transfers, more
ideologically loaded terms like “welfare” or “entitlements”
are generally used when discussing the future of redistributive programs. “Entitlements” generally refer to those programs that have been paid into by individuals through payroll
taxes, such as Social Security, Medicare, Veteran’s benefits
and Workmen’s compensation. “Welfare” refers to programs
that are need-based and “means-tested” (Rector, 2012), and is
defined by the Department of Commerce as “benefits received
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for which no current service is performed” (Eberstadt, 2012).
The cash program Earned Income Tax Credit, a subsidy for
low-wage earners, is not part of this group due to work requirements, and therefore is not included in our analysis.
These means-tested programs make an easy target politically. Proposed cuts resonate well with a predictable base of
voters. These programs are not represented by an effective
lobby as are Social Security, Medicare, and Farm Subsidies.
Proposing cuts thus generally does not incur political risks
(Derthick & Teles, 2003). The four programs that fit this description are TANF (Temporary Aid for Needy Families) cash
payments, the target of the 1996 Clinton PWRORA Welfare
Reform; SSI (Supplemental Security Income) disability payments; SNAP, the Food Stamp Program; and Medicaid,
medical care targeted to low income populations. Politically
important, they have different funding streams: TANF and
Medicaid are joint Federal/State programs, whereas SSI and
SNAP are federally funded only.
The TANF/ADFC (Temporary Aid for Needy Families,
formerly Aid to Dependent Families and Children) program
consists mainly of cash assistance. It was created in 1935 as
part of the Social Security Act, intended for “orphans” missing
one or both parents. It was considered, in the context of the
Great Depression, more advantageous to aid widows than
have them take scarce jobs from male breadwinners (Trattner,
1999). This program was funded by states receiving unlimited
Federal funds with matching state grants for eligible families.
The program was generally disliked, often on moral grounds
of encouraging out-of-wedlock birth. As individual states
had the power to set the levels, 19 states passed legislation
in the 1950s to exclude “undeserving” families such as single
mothers and African Americans (Howard, 2007; Trattner,
1999). The continual program growth during the 1960s1980s period generated further criticisms. Critics blamed the
program for a variety of social ills such as the rise of single
heads of households and family dissolution (Murray, 1984).
The widespread criticism led to the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
(P.L. 104-193, 1996). The 1996 Welfare reform for TANF under
Clinton set time limits, added work requirements, and focused
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on reducing unmarried births. Today, a large portion is given to
children directly. Matched maintenance-of-effort requirement
(MOE) fixed-amount block grants can be used in a variety of
ways other than cash payments to clients. Only about 41% is
spent on cash payments; the remainder is spent on childcare,
job training, and transportation (Falk, 2013). Currently, TANF
has not been reauthorized since 2010, and states have had to
rely on short-term block grant extensions. Waivers granted by
the Department of Health and Human Services to help with
some of the more stringent work requirements have not been
used by any state (Falk, 2013).
SSI (Supplemental Security Income) was originally an
amendment to the Social Security Act, created by Nixon in
1972 to standardize payments to the blind and disabled that
were considered inefficient and unfair. A federal program
funded by general taxes rather than social security taxes, the
program experienced rapid expansion in the 1990s. The rapid
growth for SSI also led to reform under PRWORA, restricting
eligibility in cases of drug and alcohol addiction, childhood
disability, and excluding aliens (Berkowitz & Dewitt, 2013).
Today, clients' assets must not exceed 2000 dollars.
The Food Stamp program, or SNAP, was started in 1939 by
USDA director Henry Wallace to put agricultural surpluses to
use during the depression. The program ended in 1939. During
the Johnson Administration, the program was reauthorized
and fully funded through the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which
also contained price subsidies for a variety of commodities. The
program, which can be waived by states, generally expanded
until the 1996 PRWORA legislation, which also imposed time
limits on able-bodied adults. Both Food Stamps and subsidies
were historically used as leverage to reach compromise on
each Farm bill, until the recent decoupling from the House.
The George W. Bush administration’s 2002 Farm Bill made it
easier for states to administer the program to recipients, and the
2008 Farm Bill increased benefit levels (Congressional Budget
Office, 2012). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 (ARRA) (P.L. 111–5, 2009) used $45 billion to expand
SNAP benefits. Forty-six states took advantage of the waiver
during the 2008/2009 recession (Robertson, 2012).
Medicaid is by far the largest expenditure of the four
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programs (see Table 2). Medicaid was created 1965 by the
Johnson Administration by amending the Social Security Act as
an entitlement program to help states provide medical coverage for low-income families (Katz, 1996). States have to match
up to half the federal funds (the average is 57%), and states
may bundle benefits with S-CHIP, the program that assists
with children’s health care. Federal payments vary from state
to state, according to state per capita income, ranging from
50-82% federal matching (Kaiser Family Foundation, n.d.).
Most states choose to use private providers and establish their
own rates for providers. As cost and enrollment have steadily
grown, states have cut pay to providers and tightened eligibility. Medicaid funding has become a major budgetary item
for many states in fiscal crisis, with states spending 18-20% of
state budget on the program. In 2012, 13 states cut Medicaid to
balance their budgets (Kaiser Health News, 2012). As part of
the Affordable Care Act, starting in 2014, people with income
of up to 133% of the poverty line can qualify for coverage, including adults without dependent children. State governors
who opposed the Affordable Care Act did not participate in
the Medicaid expansion.
The cash program Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was
initiated by Gerald Ford in 1975 and expanded and indexed
to inflation by Ronald Reagan in 1986 (Alstott, 2010). The
program eliminates the income tax liability of low-income
workers, an idea originally credited to Milton Friedman.
Twenty-seven million income tax filers received $63 billion in
federal refundable credits in the tax year 2012 (Flores, 2014).
The EITC is thus a costly program which leads to errors on
tax returns (Faler, 2014). The program is also implicated in creating disincentives to marriage and work, and increasing the
ranks of people exempt from tax liabilities (Alstott, 2010; Faler,
2014). However, the work requirements and Republican heritage of the program have made it largely exempt from attacks,
and there is currently no pending legislation for EITC program
reforms.

Methods
Our investigation is informed by the following research
questions:
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1. Does the Federal or state-matched structure of the
program influence program spending?
2. How well did the programs respond to the 2008/2009
recession?
3. How does political affiliation and associated
economic policies influence the state-level program
expenditure?
To address the first question, we analyze state and regional trends in enrollments and expenditures, and calculate
state and regional variations in program expenditures through
continuously compounded growth rates, commonly used for
population growth, compound interest, and forecasting. We
calculate growth rates for the years 1999-2011, the last available date from the same time series, and growth rates for the
last and current administrations 2000-2008, and 2008-2011.
Some authors of the most alarmist transfer payment program
growth rates (Eberstadt, 2012) have not clearly disclosed what
type of technique they used to calculate the resulting numbers.
In all likelihood, the high rates of growth were calculated
through relative change. Relative deltas calculate the difference as a percent of the base value between two end points,
and thus can overestimate growth among high values, and
respond poorly to negative numbers, which the programs
such as SSI, TANF have had in many years in the last decades.
In contrast, continuously compounded growth rates take the
natural log. The number of compounding periods per year increases without limit, the continuous compounding referred to
in the term.1 The natural log (ln) is the effective annual rate
of growth, the amount of time needed to reach a certain level
of continuous growth. This measure is preferable, since variables like expenditure, GDP, and population growths are often
exponential and non-linear. This measure is also preferable to
relative-change percentages because the rise and fall of growth
rates are not symmetrical.
For regions, we use the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
operational definition of U.S. regions. We calculate yearly rates
of change for the program expenditures for Medicaid, SNAP,
TANF and SSI, from BEA’s time series record of “Personal
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Current Personal Transfer Receipts (SA-35) (U. S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, n.d.).
In order to assess programs’ responses to the 2008/2009
recession, we calculate a yearly rate of change for real GDP,
Medicaid, SNAP, SSI and Medicaid for the years 1997-2011.
We compare and plot the yearly program change against GDP.
We adjust all the required time series for constant dollars with
GDP deflators, also available from the BEA.
In order to study the relationship between political affiliation and associated economic policies and state-level program
expenditure, we construct an OLS regression model. The
model tests the hypothesis that the rhetoric of a small-state
footprint, advocated more by proponents of RTW legislations
and Republican leadership, is indeed implemented in statelevel practice. In other words, RTW status and political affiliation with the Republican Party is hypothesized to be negatively associated with means-tested transfers, as we have assumed
that the preference for a small government informs state-level
redistributive policies. RTW status has been used in previous
studies as a proxy for business friendly policies, specifically
increased labor market flexibility, and less regulation (Holmes,
2000; Lafer & Allegretto, 2011; Zullo, 2011). The composite
measure “Income Maintenance” from the BEA includes TANF
and SNAP, as well as some other smaller programs such as
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); total Medicaid amounts
from the BEA are the outcome variables. We do not model
TANF and SSI individually, as the expenditures are relatively
small in comparison to SNAP and Medicaid.
The two outcome variables are modeled as a 1990-2011
growth rate, and Medicaid as a capita amount in 2011 (per
capita income maintenance is too small an amount to have
an effect). Explanatory variables modeled are: 2011 population, continuously compounded Income Growth (as measured
by growth in Per Capita Personal Income) and GDP growth
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, n.d.), percent of all ages in
poverty in 2011, percent of African Americans in 2011, percent
of Hispanics in 2011 (http://www. census.gov/), regional
dummies for the BEA regions, a dummy for Republican measured by voters’ preference in the U.S. Electoral College in the
last four consecutive Presidential elections (2000-2012) (which
captures consistent “red” states), and a Right-to-Work dummy
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to control for states’ preference for business friendly policies
and labor market flexibility. Indiana is not treated as a RTW
state in our paper due to the data years we analyze. Our study
is limited by the very broad measures of political affiliation
and economic performance used. More differentiated measures for state-level economic performance, such as exports,
sectorial composition, and measures that capture recent policy
innovations need to be developed for useful comparisons.

Results
General Description and Overview
In order to determine how spending on income maintenance programs and Medicaid compare across states, we look
at all government transfers as a percentage of personal income.
The percentage of all government transfers in income range
from 12% (North Dakota) to 26% (West Virginia). In 22 states,
government transfers do constitute nearly a fifth of income,
ranging from 19-26%. Total income maintenance, however,
only ranges from 3% to 1% of personal incomes in the 50 states.
Pensions, Disability and Social Security constitute the larger
percentage of personal income, ranging from 5-8% of personal
income. Medicare ranges from 1-5% of personal income, and
Medicaid from 1-3% (not shown in Table). With the exception
of Maine, the remaining 10 states where government transfers are above 20% have poverty rates well above the national
average of 15.9% and high percentages of minority populations (see Table 1).
Currently, thirteen states have slashed Medicaid and other
matched programs to balance strained budgets (Kaiser Health
News, 2012). Programs intended for low income populations
are targeted for cuts in national and state budget proposals.
Continuously compounded growth rates from 1990-2011 show
a decline for both TANF and SSI, the programs targeted by
welfare reform in 1996. We find 6% growth for Medicaid and
8% growth for SNAP. Enrollment for programs ranges from a
low of 1.5% and 2.5% of the U. S. population for TANF and SSI,
and 14.4% for SNAP. Medicaid by far has the highest program
expenditures, as well as largest enrollments at 17% of the population (see Table 2).
The growth rates show an interesting political effect that
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responds to our research question whether program structure
affects spending levels. Programs that require state funding
grew slower both in dollar amounts and enrollments (enrollment growth not shown). The Federal program SNAP experienced the most growth, whereas the state-matched program
TANF declined from 1990-2012, and Medicaid grew modestly.
It is important to note that while Medicaid expenditures grew
even faster than SNAP, it did not significantly grow in enrollment between 1990-2011. The Medicaid expenditure growth
was primarily driven by dramaticly rising costs of healthcare,
a widely-noted phenomenon (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2002), as state
governments have continuously restricted eligibility and cut
cost to providers.
Table 1. Government Transfers as Percent of Personal Income 2012.
All Govt.
Transfers
% of
Pers.
Income

Income
Maint.
% of Pers.
Income

% in
Poverty

West
Virginia

0.26

0.03

18

3.2

0.7

Mississippi

0.24

0.03

23.8

36

1.4

Arkansas

0.23

0.02

19.6

15.5

3.2

Kentucky

0.22

0.03

19.3

7.2

1.5

Alabama

0.22

0.03

19

29.2

1.7

South
Carolina

0.22

0.03

18.3

28.9

2.4

Maine

0.22

0.02

14.4

0.5

0.7

Michigan

0.21

0.03

17.4

14.1

3.3

New
Mexico

0.21

0.03

20.6

13.3

42.1

Tennessee

0.20

0.03

18

16.1

2.2

Arizona

0.20

0.02

18.7

5

25.3

State

% African
% Hispanic
American
Population
Population

The yearly rate of change in dollar values for the last
three decades similarly shows different patterns for matched
and federally funded programs. Medicaid growth has
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generally been below 10%, barring the flexibility expansions
under President Bush in 2001. TANF growth since the 1996
welfare reform, barring the extra ARRA funding during the
recession, has been a modest 2-3%, with 10 years of the 30
showing declines in funding.
Table 2. Program Participation, Average Monthly Benefit, and
Expenditure Growth Rates, 1990-2011.
Amount
(in
billions)

Average
Monthly
Benefit

Enrollment
2011 (in
milliions)

% of U.S.
Population

Type of
Program

Growth
19902011
Cont.
Comp.

Growth
19902011
Rel.
Change

SNAP

78

$287

45

14.4%

Federal

8%

228%

TANF

30.6

$378

4.6

1.5%

State/
federal

-1%

-28%

47

$478

7.7

2.5%

Federal

-2%

101%

17.0%

State/
federal

6%

244%

Program

SSI
Medicaid

404.1

$6,775

52.9

Growth for federally-funded programs, unlike TANF and
Medicaid, is positive for the three decades. Growth for SSI
expenditures since the 1990s has mostly ranged from 2-6%
following the restrictions from the 1996 welfare reform (see
also Table 3). With the exception of 1996 welfare reform, the
open-ended Federal program, SNAP, has grown rather quickly
both under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations.
Clearly, states have put the brakes on growth in programs that
are partially states’ responsibilities and taken advantage of
the easier access and program waivers instituted by the Bush
and Obama administrations for Food Stamps. Looking at the
growth of programs in U. S. states and regions, we find slightly
higher growth for all four programs for the Rocky Mountain
and Southwest regions, very likely due to the states that have
high percentages of Hispanic populations. States such as
Arizona (25.3%) Colorado (17.1%), New Mexico (42.1%), and
Nevada (19.7%) are represented among the top ten in growth
for these programs (tables showing individual rates of growth
in states and regions available upon request).
Are programs targeted to low-income populations responsive to economic contractions, given the means-tested nature
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of the programs? Given increased need in times of recessions
and increasing unemployment, we would expect a decrease of
programs in periods of economic expansion, and an increase
in funding during the recent recession. Looking at program
expenditure plotted to GDP yearly change, TANF and SNAP
do respond to the 2008-2009 recession by expansion (see
Figure 1). It is important to note that program expenditures
were increased and access to the program eased legislatively
by both the George W. Bush and the current administration’s
expansion of the 2009 Recovery Act (ARRA). Medicaid and
SSI, however, only moderately expanded in the 2000-2001
and 2008-2009 recessions. During the 2008-2009 recession, SSI
increased a modest 3.8%, and Medicaid 4.8%. Due to the restrictions placed on Medicaid, few adult people who lost their
employer-based health care transferred to Medicaid. The increase mainly reflected children covered (Holahan & Chen,
2011). TANF and SNAP grew 7.2% and 28% respectively (see
Table 3).
Table 3. GDP, SSI, SNAP, TANF and Medicaid Expenditure Yearly
Rate of Change, 1997-2012.
Year

GDP

SSI

SNAP

TANF

Medicaid

1997/1998

5.52

4.01

-12.1

-2.51

4.33

1998/1999

6.41

2.31

-6.02

2.82

8.44

1999/2000

6.43

2.1

-5.87

2.9

8.09

2000/2001

3.38

4.69

9.63

-1.81

13.92

2001/2002

3.47

4.53

16.57

-2.33

10.01

2002/2003

4.69

3.04

18.87

3.86

5.81

2003/2004

6.38

3.85

17.27

0.28

9.56

2004/2005

6.49

3.14

13.67

-0.34

5.04

2005/2006

5.98

4.29

-0.35

-0.7

-1.74

2006/2007

4.87

5.76

5.21

0.99

8.38

2007/2008

1.84

4.3

19.77

3.91

4.36

2008/2009

-2.28

8.1

47.87

11.18

9.14

2009/2011

3.74

3.32

21.46

5.44

7.42

2010/2011

3.97

2.41

9.34

-7.23

2.23

2011/2012

4.05

4.27

2.93

-3.31

2.86

Note: Data during and after the Great Recession years are italicized.
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SSI, a relatively small program, tracks GDP growth almost
perfectly, increasing during economic expansion, and contracting along with economic downturns. These results indicate
that Medicaid and SSI, programs that address healthcare and
disability, were only moderately increased in times of economic downturns. SNAP, the open-ended federal program with the
least restrictions in terms of eligibility, is the most expanded
program in the 2008/2009 recession (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. GDP and Medicaid, SNAP, SSI and TANF % Yearly
Change, 1997-2011
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20

Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP

SNAP

TANF

Medicaid

SSI

Political and Economic Determinants of Expenditure Growth
Our analysis looks for evidence on how the purported
preference for small government informs state-level redistributive policies, and whether business-friendly economic policies, namely RTW legislations, influence state-level program
expenditure.
Table 4 illustrates the effects of our main variables (i.e.,
RTW and Republican). In regression model I, the composite
variable Income Maintenance Growth shows a positive, statistically significant effect of RTW legislations. This finding indicates that the lower wages associated with RTW legislations
generally need to be mitigated through increased transfer payments over time.
Actually, RTW states also experience faster per capita
Income Growth, which reduces Income Maintenance Growth.
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However, this faster Income Growth is not enough to offset the
overall impact of lower wages. Even when we remove Income
Growth from our control model, RTW states still experience
Table 4. Regression Coefficients for Income Maintenance Growth,
Medicaid Growth, and Per Capita Medicaid Expenditure.
Model I

Model II

Model III

Income
Maintenance
Growth

Medicaid
Growth

Per Capita
Medicaid 2011

1.759***
(.000)

.041

-.272*
(.035)

.297

.202

-.043

.022

.183

-.066*
(.017)

-.091***
(.001)

-.090**
(.004)

.011

-.004

.018

.002

.056*
(.012)

.100***
(.000)

-.003

-.069

-.033

.070*
(.014)

-1.838***
(.000)

-1.082*
(.014)

.013

.102

Log PCPI

--

--

Log GDP

--

--

Intercept

12.652***
(.000)

9.318***
(.000)

-10.081
(.101)

.643

.518

.502

.563

.410

.390

Independent
Variable
RTW Dummy
Republican
BEA Regions
Population (in
millions)
% AA
% Hispanic
Poverty
Income Growth
GDP Growth

R Square
Adjusted R

2

Note. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001.

--1.162*
(.035)
-.131
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higher growth in income maintenance transfers (see model I in
Table 5). One tangible reason is that per capita Income Growth
is unevenly distributed by concentrating on the upper-income
populations. Therefore, the results here suggest that, at a state
level, pursuing higher, aggregate Income Growth by permitting
lower wages and increased labor flexibility would likely lead
to an aggregate increase in transfer payment needs in the state
population in the long run.
Per Capita Medicaid shows a significant but negative association with RTW dummy variable. This result indicates that
RTW states tend to adopt the policy of cutting Medicaid. RTW
legislations and Republican leadership are associated with
lower personal incomes and higher poverty rates in most RTW
states. Nine out of 10 states that occupied the lowest PCPI
ranks in 2011 were all Republican states, and seven were RTW
states. But the funding amount per capita is generally less in
RTW states; indeed, model III shows this pattern to be true
even when the poverty rate is controlled for. The lesser expenditure thus clearly indicates a state-level policy preference
rather than the extent of social need.
For a political effect, the variable Republican in the last four
elections is not statistically significant with the dependent
variables. The Republican variable becomes significant when
we remove the RTW dummy variable, which is highly correlated with Republican (r = .60, p=.000). Of the 24 Republican
states, the following seven did not have RTW statuses as of
2011: Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana,
and West Virginia. Of the 22 RTW states, the following three
did not have four consecutive Republican administrations:
Florida, Iowa, and Virginia. In a stepwise analysis not shown
here, we find that the effects of RTW and Republican behave
similarly when the other variable is not present, but RTW is
a better predicator than Republican, yielding higher R square
values in all models. RTW legislations may thus be a more important predictor on transfer payments patterns than political
affiliations.
BEA Regions, specifically the prosperous Far West region,
California, Washington and Oregon, is negatively associated
with Per Capita Medicaid. This result indicates an interesting difference in those states’ willingness to fund Medicaid programs
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compared to their Northeastern counterparts. Race has an independent effect as well. Both the composite Income Maintenance
Growth and Medicaid Growth variables are positively associated
with Percent of Hispanic population. Individual states with high
percentages of Hispanics are represented among the top ten
in individual program growth expenditure (tabular data available upon request). These results cause concern: they indicate that Hispanics are inadequately integrated into the labor
market and require medical and income assistance.
These results have been checked against the potential risks
posted by multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors
(VIF) of all models in Table 4 are below 5.0, which is below the
standard 10.0 threshold. In addition, we have run models by
removing several highly correlated variables that are near or
above .60—specifically, Log PCPI and Log GDP, which correlate
with Poverty and Population respectively; Republican, which
correlates with RTW Dummy at a .60 level; and Poverty, which
correlates with Percent of African American.

Conclusion
Where do we go from here in terms of reforms for meanstested programs? In concrete terms, which policies and programs should receive support in the interest of a more equitable society? Our results show growth for the programs from
1990-2011 has been relatively modest, with the exception of
SNAP, the food stamp program. The structure of the program
clearly affects program spending: the state matched programs
of TANF and Medicaid grew modestly, and TANF has been
in decline for many consecutive years. Clearly, states use programs they have to match less freely: forty-six governors of
all political persuasions availed themselves of SNAP waivers
during the recession. States visibly limited Medicaid spending: adjusted for inflation, growth for the U.S. was a modest
six percent, and much, if not all, could be attributed to the rise
in cost.
Given this context, turning SNAP into flat-funded state
block grants, an effort repeatedly led by House Republican legislators, would in all likelihood lead to consistently lower levels
of funding and restrict the program’s accessibility. SNAP could
possibly follow the TANF pattern of enrollment and funding
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growth since 1996, a scenario that would in all likelihood increase food insecurity among the most needy populations. In
the recent recession, SNAP, the open-ended federal program,
was the only program meaningfully expanded. TANF, SSI and
Medicaid only moderately expanded. SNAP therefore has
provided an important safety net for the needy, and should
thus be vocally supported. What other program could be as responsive as SNAP to expand the safety net in economic downturns? State budget shortfalls and cutbacks targeting poverty
programs will most likely continue in the foreseeable future,
requiring continued need for a federal program.
Income maintenance programs show an interesting geographical and political discrepancy between the need for
poverty programs and the publicly-professed political aversion. At the very heart of the debate over income maintenance
programs is the argument that less focus on redistribution and
more on business-friendly policies increases economic growth.
Findings show the contrary: the lower wages associated with
RTW policies are associated with increased income maintenance growth and increased need for state-sponsored health
care in the long term (even if the needs may not always be
met).
While such states may gain income growth for the upperclass residents and labor flexibility, the system is inequitable
because such gains need to be mitigated by all U.S. taxpayers
through federal programs, burdening residents in non-RTW
states disproportionately. These measures also seem to come
with increased transfer payment dependency. Missouri and
Michigan recently passed RTW legislations, and Pennsylvania
and Alaska are the current battlegrounds for similar legislations. The push to pass RTW legislations should be resisted.
Of special concern are states with large minority populations,
specifically Hispanic populations, which show accelerated
levels of income maintenance and state assisted medical care.
The adoption of RTW laws, combined with cutbacks in state
funding, would clearly affect these vulnerable populations.
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Endnotes:
1. Growth N = N0 ert . Where: r is the rate of natural increase. N0
refers to the initial amount of expenditure. N is the amount of
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expenditure after a certain time, t, has elapsed. e is the constant 2.
71828... (the base of natural logarithms). As the Natural Log (ln) is
the amount of time needed to reach a certain level of continuous
growth, interpretation of the resulting number is straightforward, as
it is the annual growth rate.
2. For example, the budget increase from $100 to $120 may be an
increase of 20%, but for a subsequent budget cut from $120 to $100,
the percentage change would be -16%. Assessing growth rates in
fluctuating situations by taking a natural log would remedy the
shortcoming: both ln(120/100) and ln(100/120) are symmetrical
(0.1823 and -0.1823, respectively). This measure thus offers more
precision for our assessment.

